Good news for experimenters: Subjects do not care about your welfare

Economics Letters

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 171-174

  Frank, Björn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOHENHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

C90; Experimental economics; Experimenter bias; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032350527     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00162-1     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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