Relying on a man's word? An experimental study on non-bindong contracts

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 299-332

  Irlenbusch, Bernd ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Experiments; Incomplete contracts; Promises; Reciprocity; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 11844260101     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2004.10.005     Document Type: Article

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