An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 90-116

  Ockenfels, Axel ^a   Selten, Reinhard ^b  

^a OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bargaining experiment; face to face interaction; truth signalling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001883116     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0762     Document Type: Article

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