A theory of the firm with non-binding employment contracts

Econometrica

Volumn 68, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 875-910

  Wolinsky, Asher ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Intra firm bargaining; Non binding contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242505570     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00140     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. ASH, R. (1972): Real Analysis and Probability. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
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3. DAVIDSON, C. (1988): "Multi-unit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, 6, 397-422.
4. GROUT, P. (1984): "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach," Econometrica, 52, 449-460.
5. HORN, H., AND A. WOLINSKY (1988a): "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionization," Economic Journal, 98, 484-497.
6. _ (1988b): "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," Rand Journal of Economics, 19, 408-419.
7. JACKSON, M., AND A. WOLINSKY (1996): "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 44-74.
8. STOLE, L., AND J. ZWIEBEL (1996a): "Organizational Design and Technology Choice Under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, 86, 195-222.
9. _ (1996b): "Intrafirm Bargaining and Non-Binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, 63, 375-410.
10. WOLINSKY, A. (1996, 1997): "A Theory of the Firm with Non-Binding Employment Contracts," Discussion Papers No. 1166 and 1194, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University.