Legitimacy, interest group pressures, and change in emergent institutions: The case of foreign investors and host country governments

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 361-382

  Henisz, Witold J ^a,c   Zelner, Bennet A ^b,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^d GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 11144299350     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2005.16387892     Document Type: Article

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