Political economy, information and incentives

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 4-6, 1999, Pages 649-669

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

Collusion; Incentives; Political economy

Indexed keywords

POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0032771719     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00130-5     Document Type: Article

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