Recurrent high inflation and stabilization: A dynamic game

International Economic Review

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 981-996

  Mondino, Guillermo ^a   Sturzenegger, Federico ^a   Tommasi, Mariano ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346158736     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527319     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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