A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 104-136

  Costa Gomes, Miguel A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Experiments; Non cooperative game theory; Preplay communication

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036276495     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2911     Document Type: Article

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