Behavioural studies of strategic thinking in games

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 7, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 225-231

  Camerer, Colin F ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; HEURISTIC METHODS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

STRATEGIC THINKING;

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH;

ATTITUDE; BEHAVIOR; COGNITION; COMPETITION; DECISION MAKING; GAME; HUMAN; LEARNING; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PLAY; REVIEW; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

EID: 0038060580     PISSN: 13646613     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00094-9     Document Type: Review

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