Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 279-293

  Colman, Andrew M ^a   Stirk, Jonathan A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

C72; Cognitive hypothesis testing; Decision making; Game theory; Heuristic modeling; Non zero sum games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000315045     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(98)00008-7     Document Type: Article

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