Formal models of authority: Introduction and political economy applications

Rationality and Society

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 115-138

  Zambrano, Eduardo ^a  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Formal models of authority; Microeconomics of government; Political Economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 22644452361     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/104346399011002001     Document Type: Article

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