Truth, effort, and the legal battle

Public Choice

Volumn 108, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 169-195

  Hirshleifer, Jack ^a   Osborne, Evan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035641763     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017520505573     Document Type: Article

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