Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: Recent results and future directions

Proceedings of the Discrete Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communications

Volumn , Issue , 2002, Pages 1-13

  Feigenbaum, Joan ^a   Shenker, Scott ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SCIENCE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Distributed computation; Internet algorithms; Multicast; Routing

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMPUTER SCIENCE; ECONOMICS; INTERNET; MULTICASTING; ROUTERS;

DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN (DAMD);

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 0036982153     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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