Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: A survey

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 1-41

  Forges, Françoise ^a   Minelli, Enrico ^b   Vohra, Rajiv ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CERGY PONTOISE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^c BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Core; Exchange economy; Incentive compatibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036755794     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00073-3     Document Type: Article

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