Communication, credible improvements and the Core of an economy with asymmetric information

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 63-79

  Volij, Oscar ^a,b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Common knowledge; Core

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039015990     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050005     Document Type: Article

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