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Volumn 70, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 1865-1892

The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects

Author keywords

Absence of wealth effects; Asymmetric information; Core; Ex ante; Exchange economy; Incentive compatibility; Quas linear; Transferable utility

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 0036376339     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00356     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (36)

References (36)
  • 1
    • 0003303848 scopus 로고
    • Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: The core
    • Université Catholique de Louvain
    • (1992) CORE Discussion Paper , vol.9221
    • Allen, B.1
  • 5
    • 0000963681 scopus 로고
    • Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent
    • (1985) Econometrica , vol.53 , pp. 345-361
    • Crémer, J.1    McLean, R.2
  • 34
  • 35
    • 0033414601 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
    • (1999) Economic Theory , vol.14 , pp. 155-180
    • Williams, S.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.