Differential information economies: Introduction

Economic Theory

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 263-273

  Allen, Beth ^a,b   Yannelis, Nicholas C ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035537112     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004138     Document Type: Article

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