Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

Economic Theory

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 349-365

  Forges, Françoise ^a   Heifetz, Aviad ^b   Minelli, Enrico ^c  

^a INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Core; General equilibrium; Incentive compatibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035537108     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004188     Document Type: Article

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