A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 98, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 179-188

  Forges, Françoise ^a   Minelli, Enrico ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CERGY PONTOISE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Core; Exchange economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001519389     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2759     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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