Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's m-form firm

Economic Theory

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 523-543

  Ichiishi, Tatsuro ^a   Sertel, Murat R ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032219886     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050200     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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