Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 123-147

  Vohra, Rajiv ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002732513     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2512     Document Type: Article

References (39)

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