On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 151-188

  Compte, Olivier ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036172559     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2868     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring
2. Commitment and observability in games
3. Moral hazard and private monitoring
4. Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
5. Sustaining cooperation without public information
6. "Probabilités et Statistiques, tome 2, Problèmes à temps mobile"
7. Games with imperfectly observable commitment
8. "Large Deviations"
9. Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching
10. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames
11. An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
12. Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
13. The folk theorem with imperfect public information
14. Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price formation
15. Social norms and community enforcement
16. Private observations, communication and collusion
17. Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
18. On the theory of repeated games with non-observable actions
19. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria
20. Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
21. How much common belief is necessary for a convention?
22. A theory of oligopoly