Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Econometrica

Volumn 66, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 597-626

  Compte, Olivier ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Delayed communication; Imperfect private monitoring; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000294313     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2998576     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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