Randomization in coalition contracts

Public Choice

Volumn 94, Issue 3-4, 1998, Pages 341-353

  Schmitz, Patrick W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032369329     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004940703549     Document Type: Article

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