Collusion in organizations

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 99, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 485-495

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a   Rochet, Jean Charles ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031316881     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00077     Document Type: Article

References (39)

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