Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 571-600

  Schofield, Norman ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035595834     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000077     Document Type: Review

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