Constitutional political economy: On the possibility of combining rational choice theory and comparative politics

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 3, Issue , 2000, Pages 277-303

  Schofield, Norman ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitution; Core belief; Election; Institution

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034366478     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.277     Document Type: Article

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