Anarchy in international relations theory: The neorealist-neoliberal debate

International Organization

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 1994, Pages 313-344

  Powell, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 84971881632     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300028204     Document Type: Review

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