A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 501-515

  Piccione, Michele ^a   Tan, Guofu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030209593     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0101     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. 3. K. Hendricks and R. Porter, Joint bidding and entry in federal offshore oil and gas lease auctions, University of British Columbia, 1994.
4. 4. K. Hendricks, R. Porter, and C. Wilson, Auctions for oil and gas leases with an informed bidder and a random reservation price, Econometrica 62 (1994), 1415-1444.
5. 5. P. MCAFEE AND J. MCMILLAN, Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders, J. Econ. Theory 82 (1987), 1-19.
6. 6. P. McAfee and D. Vincent, Updating the reserve price in common-value auctions, Amer. Econ. Rev. 82 (1992), 512-518.
7. 7. S. Matthews, Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: A buyer's point of view, Econometrica 55 (1987), 633-646.
8. 8. S. Matthews, Information acquisition in discriminatory auctions, in "Bayesian Models in Economic Theory" (M. Boyer and R. E. Kihlstrom, Eds.), pp. 181-206.
9. 9. P. Milgrom, Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications, Bell J. Econ. 12 (1981), 380-391.
10. 10. P. Milgrom and R. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica 50 (1982), 1089-1122.