Moral hazard and capital structure dynamics

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 1, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 890-930

  Dewatripont, Mathias ^a   Legros, Patrick ^a   Matthews, Steven A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 9944220729     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/154247603322493186     Document Type: Article

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