Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 22, Issue 6-8, 1998, Pages 703-735

  Bergemann, Dirk ^a   Hege, Ulrich ^b,c  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

D83; D92; Dynamic financial contracts; G24; G31; Learning; Optimal stopping; Relationship finance; Security design; Share contracts; Venture capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000271059     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00017-X     Document Type: Article

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