Explorations in evolutionary design of online auction market mechanisms

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications

Volumn 2, Issue 2 SPEC., 2003, Pages 162-175

  Cliff, Dave ^a  

^a HEWLETT PACKARD LABORATORIES   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Automated market mechanism design; E Marketplaces; Genetic algorithms; Online auction marketplaces; Trader agents; ZIP traders

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GENETIC ALGORITHMS; MARKETING; ONLINE SYSTEMS;

CONTINUOUS DOUBLE ACTION (CDA);

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 0038711513     PISSN: 15674223     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1567-4223(03)00017-6     Document Type: Article

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