Price prediction strategies for market-based scheduling

Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling, ICAPS 2004

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 244-252

  MacKie Mason, Jeffrey K ^a   Osepayshvili, Anna ^a   Reeves, Daniel M ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CONSTRAINT THEORY; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY; RISKS;

MARKET-BASED SCHEDULING; NON-COOPERATIVE AGENTS; PRICE-PREDICTION STRATEGIES;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 9544220567     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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