Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework

Theories of the Policy Process

Volumn , Issue , 2019, Pages 21-64

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 85145139119     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780367274689-2     Document Type: Chapter

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