Plural form and franchisor performance: Early empirical findings from Europe

Contributions to Management Science

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 75-92

  Perdreau, Frédéric ^a   Le Nadant, Anne Laure ^c   Cliquet, Gérard ^b  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE RENNES 1   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

Agency Theory; Financial Performance; Human Capital; Intangible Asset; Life Cycle Stage

Indexed keywords

EID: 85064915502     PISSN: 14311941     EISSN: 2197716X     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-2615-9_6     Document Type: Chapter

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