The governance structure of franchising firms: A property rights approach

Contributions to Management Science

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 69-95

  Windsperger, Josef ^a   Yurdakul, Askin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

Author keywords

decision rights; franchising; Governance; knowledge assets; residual income rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053383784     PISSN: 14311941     EISSN: 2197716X     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-1758-4_5     Document Type: Chapter

References (93)

1. Affuso L (2002) An Empirical Study on Contractual Heterogenity within Firms: The ‘Vertical Integration-Franchise Contracts’ Mix. Applied Economics 34: 931 – 944
2. Aghion P, Tirole J (1997) Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105: 1 – 29
3. Agrawal D, Lal R (1995) Contractual Arrangements in Franchising: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Marketing Research 32: 213 – 221
4. Alchian A (1965) Some Economics of Property Rights. Il Politico 30: 816 – 829
5. Armstrong JS, Overton TS (1977) Estimating Non-Response Bias in Mail Surveys. Journal of Marketing Research 14: 396 – 402
6. Argote L (2000) Organizational Learning: Creating, Retaining and Transferring Knowledge, Boston
7. Arrunada B, Garicano L, Vazquez L (2001) Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution. Journal of Law, Economics&Organization 7: 257 – 286
8. Bai CE, Tao Z (2000) Contract Mix in Franchising. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 9: 85 – 113
9. Baker G, Gibbons R, Murphy KJ (2003) Governing Adaptation: Decision Rights, Payoff Rights, and Relationships in Firms, Contracts, and other Governance Structures. Working Paper, Harvard Business School, October 2003
10. Barzel Y (1987) The Entrepreneur’s Reward for Self-Policing. Economic Inquiry 25: 103 – 116
11. Barzel Y (1989) Economic Analysis of Property Rights. New York
12. Berkovitz JE (2000) An Analysis of the Contract Provision in Business Format Agreements. Working Paper, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University
13. Bollen K, Lennox R (1991) Conventional Wisdom on Measurement: A Structural Equation Perspective. Psychological Bulletin 110: 305 – 314
14. Bradach JL (1998) Franchise Organizations, Boston
15. Brickley JA (1999), Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising. Journal of Law and Economics XLII: 745 – 774
16. Brickley JA, Dark F, Weisbach M (1991) An Agency Perspective on Franchising. Financial Management 20: 27 – 35
17. Brickley JA, Smith C, Zimmerman J (1996) Organizational Architecture: A Managerial Economics Approach, Homewood, Ill
18. Brickley JA, Linck JS, Smith CW (2003) Boundaries of the Firm: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Journal of Financial Economics 70: 351-384
19. Caves RE, Murphy WF (1976) Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, Southern Economic Journal 42: 572 – 586
20. Contractor FJ, Ra W (2002) How Knowledge Attributes Influence Alliance Governance Choices: A Theory Development Note. Journal of International Management 8: 11-27
21. Dahlstrom R, Nygaard A (1999) Ownership Decisions in Plural Contractual Systems. European Journal of Marketing 33: 59 – 87
22. Dant RP, Paswan AK, Kaufman PJ (1996) What we Know about Ownership Redirection in Franchising: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Retailing 72: 429-444
23. Dant RP, Kaufman PJ, Robicheaux RA (1998) Changes in the Mix of Company-Owned and Franchised Outlets: Ownership Redirection Revisited. Proceedings of the International Society of Franchising Conference, Las Vegas
24. Darr ED, Argote L, Epple D (1995) The Acquisition, Transfer, and Depreciation of Knowledge in Service Organizations: Productivity in Franchises. Management Science 41: 1750-1762
25. Demers E, Shackell M, Widener SK (2002) Complementarities in Organizational Design: Empirical Evidence from the New Economy. Working Paper, University of Rochester, W.E. Simon School of Business
26. Demsetz H (1967) Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review 57: 347 – 359
27. Demsetz H (1998) Book Review: Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure (by O. Hart). Journal of Political Economy 106: 446 – 452
28. Diamantopoulus A, Winkelhofer HM (2001) Index Construction with Formative Indicators: An Alternative to Scale Development. Journal of Marketing Research 38: 269 – 277
29. Dnes AW (1993) A Case Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 22: 367 – 393
30. Dnes AW (1996) The Economics of Franchise Contracts. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152: 297 – 324
31. Doyle P (1990) Building Successful Brands: The Strategic Option. Journal of Consumer Marketing 7: Spring, 5 – 20
32. Drolet AL, Morrison DG (2001) Do We Really Need Multiple-item Measures in Service Research? Journal of Service Research 3: 196 – 204
33. Edwards JR, Bagozzi RP (2000) On the Nature and Direction of Relationships Between Constructs and Measures. Psychological Methods 5: 155-174
34. Elango B, Fried VH (1997) Franchising Research: A Literature Review and Synthesis. Journal of Small Business Management July: 68 – 81
35. Fladmoe-Lindquist K, Jaque LI (1995) Control Modes in International Service Operations: The Propensity to Franchise, Management Science 41: 1238 – 1249
36. Gallini N, Lutz N (1992) Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising. Journal of Law, Economics&Organization 8: 471-501
37. Gibbons R (2004) Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm? Working Paper, MIT and NBER, September 2004
38. Gonzales-Diaz M, Lopez B (2003) Market Saturation, Intangible Assets and Monitoring Costs: The Internationalization of Spanish Franchising. Working Paper, University of Michigan Business School
39. Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1986) The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94: 691 – 719
40. Hall R (1993) A Framework Linking Intangible Resources and Capabilities to Sustainable Competitive Advantage. Strategic Management Journal 14: 607 – 618
41. Hart O (1990) Is “Bounded Ratinality” an Important Elementof a Theory of Institutions? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 696 – 702
42. Hart O (1995) Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford
43. Hart O, Moore J (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 98: 1119 – 1158
44. Hayek FA von (1935) The Nature and History of the Problem, In FA Hayek (ed) Collectivist Economic Planning, London
45. Holmström B, Milgrom P (1994) The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review 84: 972 – 991
46. Itami H (1984) Invisible Resources and Their Accumulation for Corporate Growth. Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce&Management 19: 20 – 39
47. Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1992) Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure. In: Werin L, Wijkander H (eds) Contract Economics, Oxford, pp. 251 – 274
48. Kacker M (1988) International Flow of Retailing Know-How: Bridging the Technology Gap in Distribution. Journal of Retailing 64: 41 – 67
49. Klein B (1995) The Economics of Franchise Contracts. Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization 2: 9 – 38
50. Klein B, Leffler KB (1981) The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance. Journal of Political Economy 89: 615 –641
51. Klein B, Murphy KM (1988) Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms. Journal of Law and Economics 31: 265 – 297
52. Kogut B, Zander U (1992) Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology. Organization Science 3: 383 – 397
53. Kogut B, Zander U (1993) Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies 24: 625 – 646
54. Kogut B, Zander U (1995) Knowledge and the Speed of the Transfer and Imitation of Organizational Capabilities. Organization Science 6: 76 – 91
55. Lafontaine F (1992) Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results. RAND Journal of Economics 23: 263 – 283
56. Lafontaine F, Raynaud E (2002) The Role of Residual Claims and Self-enforcement in Franchise Contracting. Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Society of Franchising Conference, Orlando, Florida
57. Lafontaine F, Slade ME (2001) Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision. In: Chatterjee K, Samuelson W (eds) Advances in Business Application of Game Theory, Dodrecht
58. Lafontaine F, Shaw KL (1999) The Dynamics of Franchise: Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of Political Economy 107: 1041 – 1080
59. Lafontaine F, Shaw KL (2005) Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising. RAND Journal of Economics 36: 131-150
60. Langlois RN (2002a) Modularity in Technology and Organization. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 49: 19 – 37
61. Langlois RN (2002b) The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynimics of Industrial Capitalism, Working Paper 2002-21, University of Connecticut
62. Lehman DR (1985) Market Research and Analysis. Homewood, IL: Irwin Publishing Company
63. Lewin SB (1998) Innovation and Authority in Franchise Systems: An Empirical Exploration of Plural Form. Working Paper, Iowa State University, July
64. Long JS (1997) Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables, London
65. Lutz NA (1995) Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising. Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization 2: 56 – 74
66. Malone TW (1997) Is Empowerment Just a Fad? Control, Decision Making and IT. Sloan Management Review Winter: 23 – 35
67. March JG (1991) Exploration and Exploitation. Organization Science 2: 71 – 87
68. March JG, Simon HA (1958) Organizations, New York
69. Martin R (1988) Franchising and Risk Management. American Economic Review 78: 954 – 968
70. Milgrom P, Roberts J (1995) Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Organizational Change in Manufacturing. Journal of Accounting&Economics 19: 179 –208
71. Norton SW (1988) Franchising, Brand Name Capital, and the Entrepreneurial Capacity Problem. Strategic Management Journal 9: 105 – 114
72. Nygaard A (1998) Interfirm Control of Plural Form Marketing Channels. Working Paper, Norwegian School of Management, October
73. Penard T, Raynaud E, Saussier S (2001) What Complementarities between the Structure of Franchise Contracts and Managerial Control? An Empirical Analysis Using French Data. ISNIE Conference, September 2001, Berkeley
74. Penard T, Raynaud E, Saussier S (2003a) Dual Distribution and Royalty Rates: An Empirical Analysis using French Data. Journal of Marketing Channel 10: 5-31
75. Penard T, Raynaud E, Saussier S (2003b) Contract Mix in Franchising as an Efficient Monitoring Device under Asymmetric Information. Proceedings of the EMNET Conference, June 2003, Vienna
76. Polanyi M (1962) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy, New York
77. Rajan R, Zingales L (1998) Power in a Theory of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 387 – 432
78. Rajan R, Zingales L (2001) The Firm as Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 805-851
79. Rubin PH (1978) The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of Franchise Contract. Journal of Law and Economics 21: 223 – 233
80. Scott FA (1995) Franchising vs. Company Ownership as a Decision Variable of the Firm. Review of Industrial Organization 10: 69-81
81. Shane S (1998) Explaining the Distribution of Franchised and Company-owned Outlets in Franchise Systems. Journal of Management 24: 717 – 739
82. Simonin BL (1999) Transfer of Marketing Know-how in International Strategic Alliances. Journal of International Business Studies 30: 463-490
83. Sorenson O, Sørensen JB (2001) Finding the Right Mix: Franchising, Organizational Learning, and Chain Performance. Strategic Management Journal 22: 713 – 724
84. Stein JC (2002) Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms. Journal of Finance 57: 1891 – 1921
85. Thompson RS (1992) Company Ownership vs. Franchising: Issues and Evidence. Journal of Economic Studies 19: 31 – 42
86. Von Hippel E (1994) Sticky Information and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation. Management Science 40: 429 – 439
87. Wernerfelt B (2002) Why Should the Boss Own the Assets. Journal of Economics&Management Strategy 11: 473 – 485
88. Wicking B (1995) Leveraging Core Competencies. Business Franchise, October: 86 – 87
89. Windsperger J (2001) The Fee Structure in Franchising: A Property Rights View. Economics Letters 73: 219 – 226
90. Windsperger J, Dant RP (2006) Contractibility and Ownership Redirection in Franchising: A Property Rights View. Journal of Retailing (forthcoming).
91. Wooldridge JM (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section an Panel Data. Cambridge, Mass
92. Wruck KH, Jensen MC (1994) Science, Specific Knowledge, and Total Quality Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18: 247 – 287
93. Zingales L (2000) In Search of New Foundations. Journal of Finance LV: 1623 – 1653