Politics, policy, and organizations: Frontiers in the scientific study of bureaucracy

Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-352

  Krause, George A ^a   Meier, Kenneth J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85058755564     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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