The institutional dynamics of policy administration: Bureaucratic influence over securities regulation

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 1083-1121

  Krause, George A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030489641     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2111744     Document Type: Article

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