Some complex answers to the simple question 'Do institutions matter?' Policy choice and policy change in presidential and parliamentary systems

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 145-200

  Hammond, Thomas H ^a   Butler, Christopher K ^b  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

Author keywords

Parliamentary systems; Policy change; Political institutions; Preference profiles; Presidential systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037237765     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629803015002646     Document Type: Review

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