The Revolution in Presidential Studies

Presidential Studies Quarterly

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 701-724

  Moe, Terry M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85050371026     PISSN: 03604918     EISSN: 17415705     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2009.03701.x     Document Type: Article

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