Supreme court appointments as a move-the-median game

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 231-240

  Krehbiel, Keith ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947661460     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00247.x     Document Type: Article

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