The politics of blame: Bargaining before an audience

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 100-119

  Groseclose, Tim ^a   McCarty, Nolan ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035529091     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2669362     Document Type: Article

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