The Bi-directional Relationship Between Source Characteristics and Message Content

Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2015

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 423-428

  Collins, Peter J ^a   Hahn, Ulrike ^a   von Gerber, Ylva ^b   Olsson, Erik J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

argument; Bayesian models; epistemology; evidence; source reliability

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN NETWORKS;

ARGUMENT; BAYESIAN MODELLING; BI-DIRECTIONAL; EPISTEMOLOGY; EVIDENCE; INFLUENCE SOURCE; SOURCE CHARACTERISTICS; SOURCE RELIABILITY;

RELIABILITY;

EID: 85049481244     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (25)

1. Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2002). Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments. Philosophy of Science, 69(1), 29-72.
2. Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2004). Bayesian Epistemology (OUP Catalogue). Oxford University Press.
3. Brinol, P. & Petty, R.E. (2009). Source factors in persuasion: A self-validation approach. European Review of Social Psychology, 20, 49-96.
4. Coady, C. A. J. (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Hahn, U. (2014). The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad? Topics in Cognitive Science, 5, 765.
6. Hahn, U., & Harris, A. J. L. (2014). What does it mean to be biased: motivated reasoning and rationality. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 61, 41-102.
7. Hahn, U., Harris, A. J. L., & Corner, A. (2009). Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration. Informal Logic, 29(4), 337-367.
8. Hahn, U., Harris, A. J. L., & Oaksford, M. (2013). Rational argument, rational inference. Argument & Computation, 4(1), 21-35.
9. Jarvstad, A., & Hahn, U. (2011). Source Reliability and the Conjunction Fallacy. Cognitive Science, 35(4), 682-711.
10. Leitgeb, H., & Pettigrew, R. (2010a). An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77(2), 201-235.
11. Leitgeb, H., & Pettigrew, R. (2010b). An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy*. Philosophy of Science, 77(2), 236-272.
12. Mann, T. E. & Ornstein, N. J. (2012). It's Even Worse Than it Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism, Basic Books.
13. Matsui, T., & Fitneva, S. A. (2009). Knowing how we know: Evidentiality and cognitive development. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 2009(125), 1-11.
14. Olsson, E. J. (2005). Against coherence: Truth, probability, and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15. Olsson, E. J. (2012). A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology. Episteme, 8(02), 127-143. doi:10.3366/epi.2011.0012
16. Olsson, E. J. (2013). A Bayesian Simulation Model of Group Deliberation and Polarization. In Bayesian Argumentation (pp. 113-133). Springer Netherlands.
17. Olsson, E. J., & Schubert, S. (2007). Reliability conducive measures of coherence. Synthese, 157(3), 297-308. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9056-6
18. Olsson, E. J., & Vallinder, A. (2013). Norms of assertion and communication in social networks. Synthese, 190(13), 2557-2571. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0313-1
19. Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
20. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). Source Factors and the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion. Advances in Consumer Research, 11, 668-672.
21. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123-205).
22. Pornpitakpan, C. (2004). The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A Critical Review of Five Decades' Evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34(2), 243-281.
23. Rosenkrantz, R. D. (1992). The justification of induction. Philosophy of Science, 527-539.
24. Schubert, S., & Olsson, E. J. (2012). On the Coherence of Higher-Order Beliefs. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(1), 112-135.
25. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgments of and by representativeness. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.