Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification

Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-246

  Olsson, Erik J ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Belief; Belief acquisition; Coherence; Incoherence; Justification; Knowledge; Memory; Probability; Testimony; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547518955     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199279993.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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