Interpreting Equivocal Signals: Market Reaction to Specific-Purpose Poison Pill Adoption

Journal of Management

Volumn 44, Issue 5, 2018, Pages 1953-1979

  Schepker, Donald J ^a   Oh, Won Yong ^b   Patel, Pankaj C ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^c VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

market reaction; poison pills; sensemaking; signaling theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 85045418910     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206316635250     Document Type: Article

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