On the use of poison pills and defensive payouts by takeover targets

Journal of Business

Volumn 79, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1783-1807

  Heron, Randall A ^a   Lie, Erik ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748574933     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/503648     Document Type: Article

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