Expanding epistemology: A responsibilist approach

Philosophical Papers

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 51-87

  Axtell, Guy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85009609801     PISSN: 05568641     EISSN: 19968523     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/05568640809485214     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Axtell, G. 2008a. ‘Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism,' in J. Greco, (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
2. Axtell, G. 2008b. ‘From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism,' in T. Dougherty (ed.) Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
3. Axtell, G. 2007a. ‘Two for the Show: Anti-luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance,' Synthese 158, 3: 363-383.
4. Axtell, G. 2007b. ‘Epistemic Virtue,' in M. Steup (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
5. Axtell, G. (ed.). 2000. Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.
6. Baehr, J. 2007. ‘Is There a Value Problem?,' in The Value of Knowledge, eds. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford UP), forthcoming.
7. Baehr, J. 2006a. ‘Character in Epistemology’, Philosophical Studies 128, 479-514.
8. Baehr, J. 2006b. ‘Character, Reliability, and Virtue Epistemology’, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 193-212.
9. Bernecker, S. 2006. ‘Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 20, no. 1: 81-104.
10. Bonjour, L. 2003. ‘Reply to Sosa,' in Bonjour and Sosa (eds.) Epistemic Justification. Malden, Ma.: Blackwell, 173-200.
11. Brandom, R. 2008. Between Saying and Doing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Brandom, R. 2000. Articulating Reasons. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.
13. Carter, Adam J. 2007. ‘A Happy Triumvirate: Virtue Epistemology, Contextualism, and the Safety Principle,' typescript.
14. Code, L. 1987. Epistemic Responsibility. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England.
15. Conee, E. and Feldman, R. 2004. Evidentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. David, Marian. 2001. ‘Truth as the Epistemic Goal,' in M. Steup (ed.) Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, 285-296.
17. Dalmiya, V. 2002. ‘Why Should a Knower Care?,' Hypatia 17, 1: 34-52.
18. Elgin, C. 2005. ‘From Knowledge to Understanding,' in S. Heatherington (ed.) Epistemology Futures, 199-215.
19. Feldman, R. 2005. ‘Justification is Internal,' in Sosa and Steup (eds.), 270-284.
20. Foley, R. 2004. ‘A Trial Separation between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief’, in J. Greco (ed.), Sosa and His Critics, 59-72.
21. Fricker, M. 2008. ‘Scepticism And The Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology In Time,' this volume.
22. Fricker, M. 2007a. Epistemic Injustice Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford; Oxford University Press.
23. Fricker, M. 2007b. ‘The Value of Knowledge and the Test of Time,' typescript.
24. Fricker, M. 1998. ‘Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XCVIII, 2, 159-177.
25. Goldman, A. 2002. Pathways to Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
26. Goldman, A. and Olsson, E. 2008. ‘Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,' in A. Haddock et. Al. (eds.), Epistemic Value, forthcoming.
27. Greco, J. (ed.). 2004. Sosa and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell.
28. Greco, J. 2004. ‘Holding Defeat to the Fire,' typescript.
29. Greco, J. ‘Virtue Epistemology,' in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Online.
30. Haddock A., Millar, A. and D.H. Pritchard (eds.). 2007. Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
31. Heatherington, S. 2005. Epistemological Future(s). Oxford; Oxford University Press.
32. Hookway, C. 2000. ‘Regulating Inquiry’, in Axtell (ed.) (2000), 149-160.
33. Hookway, C. 2006. ‘Epistemology and Inquiry: The Primacy of Practice,' in S. Heatherington (ed.) Epistemology Futures, 95-110.
34. Kornblith, H. 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
35. Kvanvig, J. 2008a. ‘Further Thoughts on the Swamping Problem,' typescript. APA Central, 2007.
36. Kvanvig, J. 2008b. ‘The Value of Understanding,' typescript. APA Pacific, 2007.
37. Kvanvig, J. 2005. ‘Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Aim,' in M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 285-295.
38. Kvanvig, J. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Kvanvig. J. 1992. The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.
40. Lackey, J. 2007. ‘Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know,' Synthese 156.
41. Olson, P. 2006. ‘Flourishing Rationality: A Pragmatic Approach to Virtue and Reason’. Unpublished dissertation.
42. Pritchard, D. 2008a. ‘Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology,' in J. Greco (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, forthcoming.
43. Pritchard, D. 2008b. ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value,' in Epistemology, (ed.) A O’Hear (Cambridge University Press)
44. Pritchard, D. 2008c. ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (2007 APA Pacific symposium paper and handout)
45. Pritchard, D. 2007a. ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology,' Synthese 158, 3: 277-297.
46. Pritchard, D. 2007b. ‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value,' American Philosophical Quarterly 44, 2: 85-110.
47. Pritchard, D. 2006. What is this Thing Called Knowledge. New York: Routledge.
48. Pritchard, D. 2005. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
49. Riggs, W. 2007a. ‘Why Epistemologists are so Down on their Luck’, Synthese, forthcoming.
50. Riggs, W. 2007b. ‘The Value Turn in Epistemology,' in New Waves in Epistemology, V. Hendricks & D. H. Pritchard (eds.). Ashgate, forthcoming.
51. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.). 2005. Pyrrhonian Skepticism. New York: Oxford.
52. Steup, M. and Sosa, E., (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
53. Williams, M. 2008. ‘Reliability and Responsibility,' this volume.
54. Williams, M. 2005. ‘The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism,' in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Pyrrhonian Skepticism, 121-45.
55. Williams, M. 2004. ‘Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy,' Philosophical Issues, 14: 456-475.
56. Williams, M. 2001. Problems of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
57. Williams, M. 1991. Unnatural Doubts. Oxford: Blackwell.
58. Zagzebski, L. 2005. ‘Ideal Agents and Ideal Observers in Epistemology,' in S. Heatherington (ed.) Epistemology Futures, 131-148.
59. Zagzebski, L. 2004. ‘Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About’, Philosophical Papers 33: 3, 353-377.