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1
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61049344165
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The terms 'virtue reliabilism' and 'virtue responsibilism' originate (respectively) with Lorraine Code, 'Toward a Responsibilist Epistemology'
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The terms 'virtue reliabilism' and 'virtue responsibilism' originate (respectively) with Lorraine Code, 'Toward a Responsibilist Epistemology', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45 (1984), pp. 29-50
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(1984)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
, vol.45
, pp. 29-50
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2
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0012677670
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Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology
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and Guy Axtell, 'Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology', American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (1997), pp. 1-27
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(1997)
American Philosophical Quarterly
, vol.34
, pp. 1-27
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Axtell, G.1
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3
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84886702978
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Virtue Epistemology
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E. Zalta ed
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For recent surveys of the field, see J. Greco, 'Virtue Epistemology', in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2002/entries/epistemology-virtue)
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Greco, J.1
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4
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34247548193
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Virtues in Epistemology
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Oxford UP
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and 'Virtues in Epistemology', in P. Moser (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 287-315
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(2002)
Oxford Handbook of Epistemology
, pp. 287-315
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Moser, P.1
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5
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6344290525
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Virtue Epistemology
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E. Craig ed, London: Routledge
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L. Zagzebski, 'Virtue Epistemology', in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 617-21
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(1998)
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
, pp. 617-621
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Zagzebski, L.1
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7
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60949281348
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Virtues in Epistemology
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Greco, 'Virtues in Epistemology', p. 311
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Greco1
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8
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60949186797
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Virtues in Epistemology
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'Virtues in Epistemology', pp. 296-7
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9
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79954936272
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e.g., his Putting Sceptics in their Place (Cambridge UP, 2000)
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See, e.g., his Putting Sceptics in their Place (Cambridge UP, 2000)
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10
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0040931330
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Cambridge UP 239-42, 289-90
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E. Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge UP, 1991), pp. 144, 239-42, 289-90. As I note below, an additional requirement for what Sosa calls 'reflective' or 'human' knowledge is that the knower must have an 'epistemic perspective' on the known belief, which consists of a coherent set of additional beliefs concerning the source and reliability of the original belief (ch. 11). My concern here, however, lies with the virtue component of his analysis
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(1991)
Knowledge in Perspective
, pp. 144
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Sosa, E.1
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11
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60949281348
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302
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Greco, 'Virtues in Epistemology', pp. 287, 302. For simplicity, I shall mostly ignore avoiding error, and focus instead on the end of reaching the truth. However, similar points apply to the former end
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Virtues in Epistemology
, pp. 287
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Greco1
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12
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34748898167
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Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
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M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds) Oxford UP
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See, e.g., Greco, 'Knowledge as Credit for True Belief, in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds), Intellectual Virtue (Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 155-79
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(2003)
Intellectual Virtue
, pp. 155-179
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Greco1
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13
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33747297390
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Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the Intellect
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Robert Roberts and Jay Wood draw a similar connection between intellectual character virtues and Alvin Plantinga's reliabilist or quasi-reliabilist epistemology, in 'Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the Intellect', Faith and Philosophy, 21 (2004), pp. 3-24. But they say little about how a reliabilist might incorporate the insight that character virtues are often crucial to an agent's reliability or proper function
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(2004)
Faith and Philosophy
, vol.21
, pp. 3-24
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14
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26944459958
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Virtue Epistemology
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J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds) Oxford: Blackwell at p. 521
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Greco, 'Virtue Epistemology', in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 520-2, at p. 521
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(1992)
The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology
, pp. 520-522
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Greco1
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15
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0004859773
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What is Justified Belief?
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G. Pappas ed, Boston: Reidel
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See, e.g., Goldman, 'What is Justified Belief?', in G. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge (Boston: Reidel, 1981), pp. 1-25
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(1981)
Justification and Knowledge
, pp. 1-25
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Goldman1
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16
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79954757788
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Reliabilism
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E. Craig (ed.)
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See Goldman, 'Reliabilism', in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P044SECT1), sec. 1, para. 7; my italics. The notion of causation also seems to unify or explain several other common ways of stating the reliabilist's central claim, for instance, that knowledge is true belief arrived at 'by way of, 'through', 'as a result of, etc., an exercise of intellectual virtues; or that it is true belief 'produced by', 'generated by', 'with its source in', etc., intellectual virtues
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Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Goldman1
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17
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84908881867
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Emotional Identification, Closeness, and Size: Some Contributions to Virtue Ethics
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D. Statman (ed.) Georgetown UP
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One of many examples is M. Stocker, 'Emotional Identification, Closeness, and Size: Some Contributions to Virtue Ethics', in D. Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics (Georgetown UP, 1997), pp. 118-27
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(1997)
Virtue Ethics
, pp. 118-127
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Stocker, M.1
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18
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9944257543
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ch. 7
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See Greco, Putting Sceptics in their Place, ch. 7. While Greco often speaks of 'cognitive character', he seems mainly to have in mind one's native cognitive endowment
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Putting Sceptics in their Place
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Greco1
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