Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance

Synthese

Volumn 158, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 363-383

  Axtell, Guy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemic luck; Neo Moorean; Skepticism; Virtue epistemology; Virtue responsibilism

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748822319     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9045-9     Document Type: Article

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