Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics: A game theoretical model under fuzzy information

Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 310-350

  Sacconi, Lorenzo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84906208348     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203391327     Document Type: Chapter

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